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Ely: Ely: Right to Change

RIGHT TO CHANGE OF VENUE OR CHANGE OF
JUDGE UNDER THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTION
BEN ELY*
Since the adoption of the present Missouri Constitution in 1945,
a number of interesting questions as to the effect of some of its provisions
upon the right of litigants to obtain a change of venue or a change of
judge have arisen. In the field of criminal law the entire subject has
been dealt with by the rules of criminal procedure promulgated by the
Supreme Court.' As yet, the court has not adopted similar rules for
civil cases. 2 Some of the practical questions which remain unanswered
or only partly answered by the decisions are these: (1) Where one of
the parties to a civil suit has filed an affidavit alleging the prejudice of
the inhabitants, may the judge transfer the entire case to a circuit court
in an adjoining judicial circuit? (2) Assuming that the affidavit mentioned alleges the prejudice of both the judge and the inhabitants of
the county, may such a transfer be made? (3) Is it still possible with
the consent of the trial judge for the party filing an affidavit of prejudice
against the judge and all other parties to the case to agree upon the
choice of some attorney not interested in the trial and who possesses
the qualifications legally required of a circuit judge to act as a special
judge in the case?
I.
It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that every litigant
should have all of the issues of law and fact involved in his case decided

*Attorney, Hannibal, Mo. AB. 1920, LL.B. 1922, University of Missouri.

1. The Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Courts of Missouri. These rules
were adopted April 14, 1952, and became effective January 1, 1953. For general provisions applicable to circuit courts, courts of common pleas and the Court of Criminal
Corrections see Rule 30. Rules 23.04 and 23.05 govern changes of judge upon preliminary hearings in felony cases. Rules 22.05 and 22.06 govern changes of venue
and changes of judge in misdemeanor prosecutions before magistrates. These rules,
however, for some purposes, incorporate the statutory law of change of venue in

civil cases in the magistrate court. The incorporated statute is Mo. REv. STAT. §
517.520 (1949).

2. The proposed draft of rules of civil procedure prepared by the Missouri
Supreme Courts advisory committee partially covered the matter in Rules 2.06 and
2.22. These proposals merely adopted the language of existing statutes with the
exception of the provisions for agreement upon a special judge and for the election

of a special judge. Their adoption by the court might not, it is believed, fully solve
some of the problems to be discussed in this paper. However, the proposals have
not as yet been accepted.
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by an impartial and unprejudiced tribunal, body, or officer. A judge or
juror is not impartial if his decision is in any manner affected by his
emotional reactions for or against one or more of the parties produced
by facts or circumstances outside of the evidence in the case and the law
applicable thereto. No trier of law or fact can be unbiased if he permits
himself to be swayed by a peculiar sympathy or aversion either to the
individual litigant or to the social, economic, racial, or religious group
to which one of the litigants belongs. The judge or juror is prejudiced
if he permits himself to form a fixed opinion of a case in advance not
based upon the evidence heard in court but upon other sources of information. It is quite true that every trier of the fact must, in weighing
the evidence and in applying general standards such as reasonableness
or ordinary care, make use of the general body of information which
he has received throughout his life. But this is very different from
deciding a particular fact question on the basis of rumor or of the general
feeling of the community. Even in deciding questions of law the judge,
while of course he must make use of his accumulated fund of legal
knowledge, must keep his mind open to receive and fairly evaluate the
arguments made by both sides.
Fairness and impartiality are far more apt to exist in the case of
judges who, by their professional training and long experience, are
necessarily impressed with the gravity of their responsibilities than in
the case of jurors whose connection with the judicial process is a transient one. Yet legal history demonstrates the fact that cases have been
decided by biased and prejudiced judges. The danger of such bias and
prejudice in the case of our appellate courts is small and it is minimized
by the fact that such courts are collegiate in their organization. If the
chances of one appellate judge being prejudiced are exceedingly small,
the probability that a majority of three or seven judges might be is
almost infinitessimal. Where, as is true in our nisi prius courts, there is
only one judge the chance of bias and prejudice is measurably increased.
When we are dealing with untrained jurors however, experience
teaches that improper prejudice and influences are much more apt
to exist.3 To secure an impartial jury certain procedural devices have
come down to us from an early period of the common law.4 These

3. Cf. Hoffman and Brodley, Jurors on Trial,17 Mo. L. Rsv. 235 (1952).
4. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 359; 4 Id. at 352.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol20/iss1/7

2

1955]

Ely: Ely: Right to Change

RIGHT TO CHANGE OF VENUE

include the right of the parties to examine the jury panel on voir dire,
to challenge individual jurors for cause, and to make a certain number
of peremptory challenges. 5 There are also statutory provisions designed
to insure that the members of the panel will be reasonably intelligent
persons and as far as possible impartial in their attitude toward the
case. 6 Recently there has been some effort to give to the entire jury
panel some preliminary education as to the nature and importance of
their function. In spite of these safeguards, however, it not infrequently
happens, particularly in counties of smaller populations, that fixed ideas
about the justice of a given case of strong feelings for or against one of
the litigants prevail throughout the community so that it is practically
impossible to obtain a jury of fair persons.
Where the trial judge is biased or prejudiced in a particular case
the only guarantee of a fair trial can be found in the substitution of
another judge 7 and it is logical to assume that if the judge is partial in
the beginning he cannot impartially decide the issue of whether or not
he is a proper person to try the case.8 The logical result is that which
our own courts have reached, to wit: that if any party to the case files
an affidavit stating that the trial judge is biased and prejudiced, the
disqualification of the original judge and the substitution of another will
follow automatically. 9 Where bias and prejudice of the members of the

5. Cf. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 494.190, 494.200, 546140, 546.150, 546.180 (1949).
6. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 494.240, 495.050, 495.060, 496.020, 496.150, 497.020, 497.030,
498.010, 498.020 (1949). These sections create boards of jury commissioners or
supervisors. They are effective only where the members of such boards fully
realize the grave importance of their duty and are able to devote sufficient time
thereto.
7. BLACKSTONE says (1.c. note 4, supra) that the parties litigant originally had
the right to challenge the judge for interest or prejudice but that they had lost
this right by his time. The reasons given for depriving them of this right to wit,
that the judge was sworn -to try the case impartially and that oppressive conduct on
his part would lead to his removal from office, seem hardly adequate.
8. Crumpacker, The Change of Venue Problem, 20 IND. L. J. 283 (1945).
9. State v. Mitts, 29 S.W.2d 125 (Mo. 1930); State ex rel. v. Waltner, 169
S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1943). The federal cases also accept the doctrine that the affidavit
of prejudice may not be controverted by other evidence. Nations v. United States,
14 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1926) cert. den. 273 U.S. 735, 71 L. Ed. 866, 47 Sup. Ct. 243 (1926).
Under the state decisions the affidavit of prejudice need only state the ultimate fact
that the judge is prejudiced but under the federal decisions it must state "the facts
constituting the prejudice." This statement is difficult to understand. Prejudice is
a mental state and it is impossible to describe any group of facts which constitute
that condition of mind. What the federal cases really mean is that the affidavit must
state evidentiary facts from which some one may draw the inference that the judge
is prejudiced. Since the challenged judge must in the first instance decide whether
or not this inference may be drawn, he is to that extent required to pass upon the
issue of his own prejudice. It is a peculiar phenomenon of psychology that the more
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community in general from whom the jury panel must be selected is
shown, the only solution would seem to be either importing a jury from
another community or transferring the case for trial to another county
from whose inhabitants the jury may be selected. In practice, Missouri
has long chosen the latter of these two alternatives and it has the
advantage of being less expensive and of causing less inconvenience to
the prospective jurors than the former.
In our statutes and in the earlier judicial cases the term "change
of venue" has been used indiscriminately to refer to the substitution,
in the original court, of one judge for another. Strictly speaking, however, the word "venue" refers to the county or district in which a case
is to be tried.10 A change of venue therefore must involve the transfer
of a trial from its original situs to another locality. As a practical matter
it seems important to distinguish between the removal of a trial from
one district to another district and the substitution of one judge for
another judge without the removal of the case. The first will be referred
to as a change of venue; the second as a change of judge. This terninology has recently been employed by our own supreme court."
It must be borne in mind that sometimes a change of venue will
also effect a change of judge. If a case is pending in X county which is
in a circuit presided over by Judge A and a change of venue is awarded
to Y county in a circuit presided over by Judge B, an incidental result
will be a substitution of a new judge.
II.
Some theoretical questions must receive our consideration before
we direct our attention to the practical question with which we are
primarily concerned. Section 5 of Article V of the Missouri Constitution
expressly confers on our Supreme Court the power to make rules of
practice and procedure for all the courts of the state.12 Does this pro-

prejudiced an individual is the more sincerely he believes in his own fairness.
Hence the Missouri rule is preferable to the federal rule.
10. BouvR's LAw DicTiONAnY, sub verb.
11. State v. Mitts, supra, note 9.

12. "The supreme court may establish rules of practice and procedure for all

courts. The rules shall not change substantive rights, or the law relating to evidence,
the oral examination of witnesses, juries, the right of trial by jury or the right of
appeal. The court shall publish the rules and fix the day on which they take effect

but no rule shall take effect before six months after its publication. Any rule may
be annulled or amended by a law limited to the purpose."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol20/iss1/7
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vision empower the court to regulate changes of venue and changes of
judges by rule? It is important to determine the extent of that power.
If we examine the language of Section 5 we will see that it adopts the
previously recognized dichotomy of the entire field of law into procedural rules and substantive rules. The forner lie within, the latter without, the court's rule making power. But the line between procedure
and substance is not one of clear demarcation. Between those rules
which are indubitably procedural and those which are obviously substantive lies a vague penumbra in which rules are found which partake
somewhat of both characteristics. A working definition may be attempted, however, which for present purposes may -be deemed sufficient.
Substantive rules are those which create and define the primary
rights, powers, privileges, and immunities which one person has against
another. Procedural rules are those which prescribe the steps which
a person whose primary right has been violated or threatened must take
in order to invoke the aid of the political agents of society for the protection of his right or the redress of the injury he has suffered because
of its violation. 13 It may be objected that we have merely used many
words to express the truism that procedural rules are procedural. We
think this is not true. A person has a substantive right against another
when and if conduct of that other which invades the interest of the
possessor of the right will be followed by societal action against the
actor. For every right there must be a remedy. But for the existence
of the right it is immaterial what the nature of the remedy may be.
As long as the possessor of the right may in any manner invoke the
protective action of society through its political agents the right exists;
and the right is not modified or destroyed by merely changing the steps
which its injured possessor must take in order to obtain redress. Thus A
has a substantive right against B that B will not intentionally inflict
upon A a harmful or offensive bodily contact. A has this right simply
because if B commits a battery upon him A can in some manner secure
redress from the courts. The manner is immaterial. Therefore the rule
creating and defining A's right is substantive but the rules requiring A
to file a petition, obtain service of process, and take certain other steps
during and after the trial are procedural. A modification of these latter
rules, so long as A is left with some form of remedy, does not destroy or
modify his substantive right.
13. Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 YA= L. J. 501 (1924).
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Judged by this standard the rules which permit changes of venue
or substitutions of judge are obviously procedural. They do not even
lie in the debatable ground. They do not create, destroy, or modify
anyone's primary rights.
To revert to the language of Section 5 of Article V, however, will
demonstrate that there are certain exceptions contained therein to the
court's power to make purely procedural rules. There are certain subclasses of the general category of procedure to which the rule making
power does not extend, such as rules of evidence, rules respecting the
oral examination of witnesses, rules defining the right of trial by jury,
and the conduct of the jury and those granting the right of appeal. The
matter of change of venue and change of judge in no way comes within
any of these accepted subclasses unless it be that having to do with
the right of trial by jury.
It has been said, although not directly decided, by the courts of
this state that in criminal cases a change of venue may not be awarded
unless it is requested by the defendant. 14 The argument on which this
rests is that the right to trial by jury guaranteed by Sections 18 (a) and
22 (a) of Article I of the constitution is a right to be tried by a jury
of the vicinage or county and that this right would be interfered with
if the state were permitted to take a change of venue. It is clear that
the right to trial by jury is that right as it was known at common law1"
and it is equally clear that at common law changes of venue were always
permitted even in criminal cases and even when they were sought by

14. Thus In re McDonald, 19 Mo. App. 370, 377 (1885), the court said: "So, in
criminal prosecutions, while the privilege is usually accorded to the accused to take
a change of venue, in order that he may escape local prejudice and passion, and to

secure a fair and impartial trial, it does not recognize the right of the state to change
the venue." This case held unconstitutional a statute which permitted an offense
committed within 500 yards of a county line to be indicted and prosecuted in either
county. In Ex pcarte Slater, 72 Mo. 102 (1880), the court held unconstitutional a
statute which permitted the circuit judge, upon finding that an unprejudiced grand

jury could not be impaneled in the county in which an offense had been committed,

to refer the matter to a grand jury in another county and which permitted a trial
in the second county of an indictment returned by such grand jury. See also State
v. McGraw, 87 Mo. 161 (1885); State v. Hatch, 4 S.W. 502 (Mo. 1887); State v.
Anderson, 90 S.W. 95 (Mo. 1905); State v. Meyers, 90 S.W. 100 (Mo. 1905); State v.

Clarke, 90 S.W. 100 (Mo. 1905); State v. Gorman, 90 S.W. 100 (Mo. 1905). A contrary

view, however, has been taken by the courts in many jurisdictions which have
constitutional provisions similar to our case. Annotation, 80 AL.R., 355 (1932). The
reasons, theoretical and practical, for permitting the state to take a change of venue
are well stated in the case of Commonwealth v. Davidson, 91 Ky. 162, 15 S.W. 53
(1891).
15. State ex rel. v. Coleman, 152 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. 1941).
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defendant.1 6

the Crown and not by the
If we assume, however, that to
permit the state to take a change of venue would deprive the defendant
of his right to a jury trial, does it follow that any rule with respect to
changes of venue is a rule affecting the "right to trial by jury"? Since
changes of venue were universally recognized at common law this would
not seem to follow.
It is to be noted that the rule-making power of the United States
Supreme Court, while of statutory and not constitutional origin, is, like
that of our state supreme court, limited to matters of practice and procedure. Yet in the rules of criminal procedure for the federal courts
the subject of change of venue has been covered.17 The Supreme Court
of Iowa, under similarly limited authority, has included in its rules
changes of venue and changes of judge.' 8 Our own supreme court has
made provision for these matters in its rules for criminal procedure. 19
One other constitutional question needs to be noticed. In Article
III, Section 40 the legislature is forbidden to pass any local or special
law "changing the venue in any civil or criminal case". Under a similar
provision of the Indiana constitution doubts were expressed as to the
authority of the supreme court to make rules of procedure governing
changes of venue. 20 This position must be based upon the following line
of argument. If Section 6 gives to the supreme court the power to regulate changes of venue by rule, it necessarily deprives the legislature of
the power to make similar regulation by any kind of statute whether
general or special. But if this were true it would have been unnecessary
to have included in the constitution the provision against any special
statute changing the venue. The convention would not have done an
unnecessary thing so it must have intended to exclude the subject of
change of venue from the court's rule making power.
The validity of this argument depends upon the proposition that
the legislature can make no statutory procedural rules upon subjects

16. Rex v. Harris, 3 Burr. 1330, 97 Eng. Rep. 858 (1762); Rex v. Nottingham,
4 East 208, 102 Eng. Rep. 810 (1803); Rex v. St. Mary's on the Hill, 7 T.R. 735, 101
Eng. Rep. 1226 (1798); And see Rex v. Eaton, 2 T.R. 89, 100 Eng. Rep. 49 (1787); Rex
v. Stannard, 7 T.R. 162, 100 Eng. Rep. 950 (1791); Rex v. Thomas, 7 Maule and S.
442, 105 Eng. Rep. 897 (1815); Rex v. Davies, 5 T.R. 626, 101 Eng. Rep. 350, 5 Eng.
Rul. Cas. 543, 8 Eng. Rut Cas. 201 (1794).

17. Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Federal Courts, Rule 21.

18. Comment, Change of Venue under the new Iowa Rules, 29 IoWA L. Ry. 108

(1943). Cf. New Jersey Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3:3-3.
19. Supra, note 1.
20. Crumpacker, op. cit. note 8, supra.
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which lie within the scope of the court's rule making power. The soundness of that contention must be determined by the view to be taken of
the relationship between the court and the legislature in the field of
procedural rule making.
It would seem that there are three possible positions to take in
regard to this relationship between court-made rules and procedural
statutes:
(1) The court's rule-making power is limited to those matters
which the legislature had not covered by statute. The rules to be adopted
must be merely supplementary to the statutory law.
(2) The court's rule-making power is exclusive and the legislature
may not in the future adopt any statute of a procedural nature.
(3) The power of the court and the legislature are concurrent
although the former is superior to the latter. The legislature, under
this theory, might adopt procedural statutes on any subject which at
the time of their adoption had not been covered by court rule and such
statutes, along with those procedural statutes which were in force in
1945, will remain in force until they have been abrogated by the promulgation of the court rules covering the subject. The history of procedural regulation by court rule prior to 1945 leads inevitably to the rejection of the first of these alternatives. 21 Before 1840 legal procedure
was largely governed by rules of the common law. But in the middle
of the last century most American states adopted comprehensive codes
of procedure enacted by the various state legislatures. There were two
objections to the statutory regulation of procedure. First, the state legislatures were in large part made up of laymen who had little or no
knowledge of the requirements of a just and efficient procedural system.
Second, statutory rules were hard to change. Under the legislative codes
procedure came to be regarded as an end in itself and not as only a
means towards securing a just disposition of the case. Toward the end
of the century Great Britain took the lead in remedying these defects
by entrusting to the courts the power to make their own procedural
rules. In 1910 began an agitation in this country for the grant of similar
power to American courts. The first step came when the federal Supreme

21. BARmoN AxD HoLTzoFr, FEDEAL PRAcTIcE Am PsoCEDURE, Chapter 1 (1950);

Scott, The Progress of the Law, 33 H~Av. L. REv. 236 (1919); Hudson, The Proposed
Regulation of Missouri Procedure by Rules of Court, 13 U. oF Mo. BuLL., Law Series
3 (1916).
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Court was given the power to make such procedural rules. The precedent
thus set by the federal government was soon followed by many of the
states. All of this history was well known to the constitutional convention
of 1945 which adopted Article V, Section 5, conferring on the Missouri
Supreme Court power to make rules of practice and procedure, as was
the fact that these other courts, in adopting procedural rules, had not
felt themselves to be bound by existing statutes but had in many respects
completely changed statutory procedural machinery.
On the other hand it seems equally clear that the constitution did
not repeal existing procedural statutes. Had it done so we would have
been left without any system of procedure at all since it would obviously
take years for the court to draft a complete set of rules and since the
rules when promulgated could not take effect for six months. The same
considerations would lead to the conclusion that where there is no rule
of the supreme court governing a particular matter the legislature may
regulate it by statute. 22 We are left therefore with the third alternative.
Under this interpretation procedural statutes which were in force in
1945 remain in force until they have been changed by court rule. In
the same way where there is no court rule governing a particular matter a statute on the subject may be adopted. But whenever the court
sees fit to promulgate a rule all then existing statutes which are in conflict
therewith are superseded and in effect repealed or suspended until the
court has withdrawn its rule or the legislature by a statute expressly
so providing and limited to that one purpose shall have abbrogated
the rule.
This interpretation disposes of the question raised by the constitutional prohibition against changes of venue by special law. It also permits
us to determine the effect of existing statutes of a general nature governing changes of venue and changes of judge.
To summarize: the supreme court has power to adopt rules governing changes of venue and changes of judge in civil and criminal cases
so long as these rules do not violate other provisions of the constitution.

22. Consider the following possible case. The court adopts a rule-let us say

defining the method of serving process--and thus annuls all existing statutes on
that subject. The legislature then repeals the rule by specific act. We would be
left without any law on the subject for at least six months unless the legislative
repeal had the effect of automatically revising the old statute or unless the legislature
had power to enact an ad interim statute on the subject.
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Until such rules are adopted existing statutes not otherwise unconstitutional remain in full force and effect. When any rule is adopted all
statutes which are in conflict therewith cease to have any operative effect.
I.
We now reach the heart of our problem. We must inquire what
effect if any Section 6 and 15 of Article V have had upon the matters
here under discussion. To understand the basic problems and to properly
evaluate the court decisions it will be necessary briefly to summarize
the scheme for changes of venue and changes of judge provided in the
existing statute. Although, so far as criminal cases are concerned, the
matter has been completely covered by court rule, the existing statutes
must be noticed because some of the decided cases arose before the
rules were promulgated.
The provisions for changes of venue and changes of judge in civil
cases are principally confined to Chapter 508, Missouri Revised Statutes
(1949). If both parties consent, a true change of venue or removal of
the cause from one circuit court or common pleas court to another must
be awarded without the filing of a formal application, the statement of
any grounds, or the exercise of any discretion by the court. 23 By the
terms of the section, the power of the parties by unanimous consent, to
transfer the cause to another venue is not limited to transfers between
the courts of the same judicial circuit. Thus the parties by agreement
can, as an incidental result of changing the venue, also change the
judge.
If the trial judge has a pecuniary interest in the case, is related to
any of the parties, or (before going on the bench) was of counsel, it
is made his duty to disqualify himself without any application having
been made by any party and to award a change of venue.2 4 Although
this section clearly deals with the disqualification of the judge alone, it
too effects a change of judge only through changing the venue in the
case. This is shown by the fact that the proviso in this section relieves
the judge of the duty of ordering a change of venue if all the parties
agree upon his continuing in the case or upon some member of the bar
as a special judge or upon the election of a special judge by the bar.

23. Mo. REv. STAT. § 508.080 (1949).

24. Id. § 508.100.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol20/iss1/7
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There is no express provision in these cases of automatic disqualification
for calling in another judge to preside at a trial in the original venue.
Changes other than those granted by consent of all parties or on

the court's own motion are awarded when one of the parties has filed
his affidavit alleging prejudice either of the inhabitants or of the judge
(or of both).25 Where the affidavit charges prejudice of the inhabitants

only, the cause must be removed from the county. If the circuit consists
of several counties it is sent to another county in the same, the adjoining,

or the next adjoining circuit. If the circuit consists of one county only
the case would of necessity have to be sent to another circuit and thus
an incidental change of judge would be brought about. In counties
having more than 75,000 inhabitants the applicant must, if his opponent
files a counter-affidavit, make proof satisfactory to the original judge
26
of existence of the prejudice.
Where the application alleges prejudice of the judge a different
procedure is provided for multi-judge courts from that used in courts
having a single judge. 27 In the case of the multi-judge courts the cause
is simply transfered from the division in which it was originally pending
to another division. It is in effect merely reassigned. Thus there is no
real change of venue but merely a change of judge.
In the case of single judge courts, the procedure is slightly more
complex. Here the judge must permit the parties to see if they can agree
either on the choice of an attorney to act as special judge or upon the
election of a special judge by the members of the bar. After the failure
of the parties to so agree, but only after such failure, the original judge
has the power and duty to order a true change of venue transferring
28
the cause to another circuit.
The statutes are silent as to what course is to be followed if the
applicant swears against both the judge and the inhabitants. In counties
which comprise an entire judicial circuit, the answer seems to be that
a charge of prejudice against the judge is usually superfluous. The removal of the case from the county will automatically bring about a
change of judge. There might be exceptional cases, however, in which

25. Id. §§ 508.090, 508.130.
26. Id. § 508.140.
27. Id. § 508.110.
28. Id. § 508.140.
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this is not true. Assume that the opponent has filed a counter-affidavit
1 as to the prejudice of the inhabitants. It is plain that the original judge
whose prejudice has been alleged in the application ought not to pass
upon any question in the case and hence should not pass upon the existence of prejudice of the inhabitants. The only possible solution would
be reassignment of the case to another division the judge of which would
then pass upon the question of the prejudice of the inhabitants, and if
he found such prejudice to exist he would order the transfer of the case
to another division. It is in effect merely reassigned. Thus there is no
circuit. It might seem that such a procedure would violate the statutory
prohibition against granting two changes of venue to the same side. 20
This is not true. For the first transfer involved only a change of judge
and the second a true change of venue. Any other solution would
deprive the party who believes that both the judge and the inhabitants
are prejudiced against him of his right to have both a new judge and
a new jury.
In the case of single judge circuits the solution is somewhat difficult.
Where the applicant has sworn against both the judge and the inhabitants, the matter might be simply disposed of by ordering a transfer to
another circuit. But it might be said that this would violate the statutory
requirement that the parties be permitted to agree upon a special judge
before such transfer is made. If they are permitted to agree upon a
special judge and the actual venue is then changed to another county
it might be argued that two changes of venue were thereby allowed
to the same side in the case. This reasoning would seem fallacious for
the reasons advanced in our discussion of the multi-judge courts.
A somewhat connected question arises when one of the parties has
first sworn against the judge and a special judge has been selected to
try the case and the same party thereafter swears against the inhabitants.
On the reasoning above advanced it would seem that the second application should be sustained and the trial removed to another county of
the same circuit where the special judge already chosen would preside.
This exact question seems not to have been passed on by the courts.
In one case, however, where one of the parties took change of venue
and the case was sent out of the original judicial circuit, the same party
was held not to be entitled to disqualify the judge of the second circuit.8 0

29. Id. § 508.090.
30. Graves v. Davidson 68 S.W.2d 711 (1933).
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The decision seems to be sound for in the first instance the party had
secured both a change of venue and a change of judge and, since the
opponent who resisted the second application would certainly not have
agreed to a special judge, there would actually have been two changes
of venue given to the same side. The court, however, relying on the
statutory language, refused to make any distinction between change of
venue and change of judge.
It is to be noted that these statutes make no mention of calling in
a judge from some other circuit to sit in the trial of the case. While the
statutes have on the whole worked with fair efficiency, 31 they leave open
many theoretical questions which can give rise to difficulties in practice.
These difficulties, it is believed, all stem from the failure of the legislature
to recognize the necessary distinction between change of venue and
change of judge and the importance of permitting any party to have
either a change of venue or a change of judge or both.
In criminal cases the entire subject of changes of venue and changes
of judge is now dealt with by the Rules of Criminal Procedure. These
rules completely supplant the statutes on that subject. Those statutes,
which are contained in Chapter 545, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949),
must still be noticed for the reason that many of the decisions upon which
we must later comment were rendered before the adoption of the rules.
The statutory scheme carefully distinguished between true changes
of venue and disqualification of the judge. Nevertheless the legislature
unfortunately applied the term "change of venue" to both situations.
The scheme provided for in the statutes may be briefly analyzed
as follows. True changes of venue were to be allowed on application of
32
the defendant only, and upon proof of the prejudice of the inhabitants.
In smaller counties this proof was to be made simply by the filing of
affidavits of five disinterested persons who were residents of different
neighborhoods in the county. In larger counties the issue of prejudice

31. Complaint is sometimes made that litigants have made use of change of
venue and change of judge procedure simply to secure a delay in the trial of a
case. It would seem impossible, however, to avoid the occasional abuse of the procedure and at the same time preserve the important right of the parties to a hearing
before an impartial tribunal. Where only one change of venue and one change of
judge is allowed each side even in a multi-party case the delay in trial cannot be
too important.
32. Mo. Rzv. STAT. §§ 545.430 and 545.490.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1955

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1955], Art. 7
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

26

[Vol. 20

had to be tried to the judge. 33 If the affidavit of the defendant and his
proof showed prejudice only of the inhabitants of the county in which
the case was pending, the case was to be transfered to another county
in the same judicial circuit. If the affidavit charged prejudice of the
3
entire circuit the cause was to be removed to another circuit. 4 Of
course, if there were only one county in the circuit the removal had
to be from the circuit.
An entirely different set of provisions governed changes of judge.
If the judge knew of facts which disqualified him or if the defendant
and two supporting witnesses swore that the judge was interested he
must step aside.35 In such event he was required to permit the defendant
and the prosecutor to agree upon a special judge. If they did not so agree
he was required to call in the judge of another circuit court.8 6 In the
case of multi-judge courts the substituted judge might be the judge
of another division of the original court.37 If after making at least two
attempts to secure another judge to sit in the original court, he met
with failure he was directed to change the venue to another circuit.8 8
This latter provision was possibly unconstitutional because it brought
about a change of venue without the specific consent of the defendant.
Changes of judge, of course, could be awarded on application of the
state as well as the defendant. 39
In addition to simplifying the statement of the grounds for both
changes of venue and changes of judge the new rules have simplified the
procedure when a change of judge is allowed. They provide that the
disqualified judge may at his option request the supreme court to assign
some other judge to that task.40 They eliminate the provision for the
agreement of a party upon an attorney to act as special judge and the
provision for the election of a special judge by the bar.

33. Id. § 545A30. The same principle is continued in effect by Rule 30.04 (Unless
otherwise indicated, all references herein to Rules are to Rules of the Supreme Court
of Missouri). Under the statute it was held that the five supporting affidavits were
insufficient if they merely stated the ultimate fact of prejudice. They were required
to state evidentiary facts from which this ultimate fact might be inferred. State v.
Wilcox, 44 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1931). This decision would probably still be followed.
34. Mo. RPv. STAT. § 545.450; cf. Rule 30.01.
35. Mo. REv. STAT. § 545.660. This has been slightly modified by Rule 30.12.
36. Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 545.670, 545.690.
37. Id. § 545.650.

38. Id. § 545.690.
39.

State ex rel. McAllister v. Slate, 214 S.W. 85 (Mo. 1919).

40. Rule 30.13.
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Both under the old statutes and under the new rules the defendant is
entitled to have both a change of venue and a change of judge. The
applications need not be simultaneous. If the change of venue is first
ordered the substitute judge will appear and sit in the court to which
the case was removed. If the substitution of the judge occurs first the
new judge has power to order a change of venue. 41 The only situation
not directly covered seems to be that in which a change of venue has
been awarded to a different judicial circuit, thereby by necessary implication substituting a different judge. Can the defendant then file an
affidavit disqualifying the second judge? The answer probably should be
that he can, for the law must consider the necessity of an absolutely fair
trial for the defendant as out-weighing the slight additional delay which
this procedure would involve.
There is a third group of statutes which have some bearing upon
the change of venue problem. They are contained in Sections 478.027
to 478.060, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949). Most of the provisions
now contained in these sections were adopted in 1877,42 more than half
a century after the enactment of the first change of venue laws 43 and

at a time when the systems of changes of venue in civil cases had been
crystallized into its classic form.
44
Sections 478.027 and 478.030 are not particularly in point here.
They merely provide that when the governor shall receive satisfactory
proof that a regular circuit judge is, by reason of physical or mental
illness, incapable of performing his functions he may appoint a temporary
judge to serve until the regular incumbent is restored to health.

There next follows a provision that whenever the circuit judge
shall be "sick, absent, or for any reason unable to hold any term or part
of any term" he may call in another circuit judge to hold such term or
part of a term. The supreme court at first held that this provision and
the constitutional section on which it was based authorized a disquali-

41. Rule 30.14.
42. Mo. Laws 1877, p. 218.
43. The first change of venue law in civil cases seems to have been enacted in
1807. 1 Terr. Laws, p. 117. In criminal cases the first statute seems to have been
enacted in 1882. 1 Terr. Laws, p. 1017. Many interesting historical facts concerning
these laws are set out in the opinion of Farris, J., in State ex rel. McAllister v. Slate,
supra, note 39; see also Jim (a slave) v. The State, 3 Mo. 147 (1832).
44. Section 478.027 is probably unconstitutional in part as being in conflict with
Section 27 of Article V of the Constitution of 1945.
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fled circuit judge to call in another for the sole purpose of trying the
case in which the judge was disqualified4" and that this was true even
though an application for "change of venue" based on the judge's disqualification had previously been filed. Later, in the case of State ex rel
v. Higbee,46, the court overruled these previous decisions and took the
view that the disqualified judge against whom an application for change
had been filed was required to proceed under the ordinary change of
venue statute by first ascertaining if the parties could agree upon a
special judge or upon the election of a special judge, and if they could
not, ordering the removal of the cause to a court presided over by another judge. This case was followed and approved shortly before the
4
adoption of the present constitution in State ex rel. Niccerson v. Rose.
The two last cited cases recognize that the provisions of the 1875 constitution granting to the circuit judge the power to call in another circuit
judge were self-enforcing but apparently go upon the ground that to
call in a judge for the trial of one case is to be distinguished from calling
him in to hold a part of a term. This is probably a sound conclusion.
Since the substituted judge would, where a change of judge had been
properly applied for, retain jurisdiction until the case was finally disposed
of even though this might carry through several terms of court.
The remaining sections in the group have to do with the mechanics
of the selection of a special judge. In brief, such a judge is to be elected
by a majority vote of the members of the bar then present in court, a
quorum of five being required.48 He is to possess the qualifications of
a circuit judge. He has all the powers of a regular judge, must take an
oath, and is to receive compensation fixed by statute.49
The above survey summarizes the principal features of our statutory
law as it existed in 1945. The legislature has since that date made no
changes therein. It remains to see how far the constitutional changes
adopted in 1945 have affected this scheme.
IV.
In addition to the provisions of Article V, Section 5, which we have
discussed, we will also be concerned with Sections 6 and 15 in the same

45. State ex rel. Lamm v. Mid-State Serum Co., 272 S.W. 99 (Mo. App. 1925).
46. 43 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. 1931).
47. 175 S.W2d 768 (Mo. 1943).
48. Mo. REv. STAT. § 478.037.

49. Id. §§ 478.037, 478.040, 478.050.
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article. The former grants to the supreme court the power to transfer
judicial personnel from one court to another. 50 The latter grants the
same power to a limited extent to the circuit judges by providing that any
circuit judge may call in another circuit judge to sit in his court.5 1 Before
considering the effect of these sections on a theoretical basis, it would
be well to examine the cases touching on the point which have heretofore been decided by the supreme court. Our examination will be limited
to those cases decided under the provisions of the 1945 Constitution.
In State v. Massey5 2 the regular judge of the circuit court in which
a criminal proceeding was pending had been counsel for the State before
going on the bench. He therefore entered an order disqualifying himself
and calling in the judge of another circuit to try the case. The record
did not show that a notice of this action had been given to the supreme
court as required by its rule.53 On appeal, the convicted defendant contended that the substituted judge had no authority to hear the case
because under Section 6, supra, the sunreme court had power over the
transfer of judicial personnel. The substitution of the second judge
was, according to the defendant, a transfer of personnel and as the
supreme court's power was exclusive, the regular circuit judge had no
authority to make the transfer. The supreme court apparently accepted
the view that this substitution in the court of original jurisdiction, a
change of judge without change of venue, was a transfer of personnel
within the meaning of the constitution. However, the court refused to
accept the proposition that its power over such transfers was exclusive.
It held that the constitution vested the power of transfer in such cases
concurrently in the supreme court and the original nisi prius court.
As will be seen later cases have adhered to this theory of concurrent
power, laying down the limitation, however, that the supreme court's
power is superior and that the trial court may act only when the supreme
court has not acted. It will be noted that this case was decided before
the promulgation of the new criminal rules but that, in apparent violation
of the existing statute, the parties were not given a chance to agree upon
a special judge.
50. Section 6, Article V: "The Supreme Court may make temporary transfers
of judicial personnel from one court to another as the administration of justice
requires, and may establish rules with respect thereto."
51. Section 15, Article V: "... . Any circuit judge may sit in any other circuit
at the request of the judge thereof. In circuits composed of a single county and having
more than one judge, the court may sit in general terms or in divisions."

52. 219 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. 1949).
53. Supreme Court Rules, Rule 11.01.
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The next case decided is State v. Scott.54 This case, too, was decided
before the new rules were promulgated. The regular judge, Moulder,
had called in Judge Blair to sit in his place. Defendant filed an application for change of judge based upon the alledged disqualification of
Judge Blair. Judge Blair then vacated the bench and, at the request of
Judge Moulder the supreme court assigned Judge Maughmer to hear the
case. The defendant objected to Judge Maughmer's jurisdiction on the
ground that the parties had not been first given a chance to agree upon
a special judge. In order to sustain Judge Maughmer's jurisdiction, two
lines of reasoning were opened to the court. It might have held that
the then existing statutory provision for the election of a special judge
was entirely unconstitutional since it was an attempt by the legislature
to regulate a transfer of judicial personnel and since that subject had
been placed by the constitution entirely in the hands of the court. Some
theoretical difficulties with this reasoning will be mentioned later. The
Supreme Court, saying that the question had not been briefed before
it but expressing serious doubts as to the constitutionality of the statute, 5
chose to place its decision upon another ground. This second theory
which was adopted by the court is as follows. Even though the legislature had power to adopt a statute regulating a transfer of judicial personnel, such a statute could not possibly place any limitation or condition
upon the exercise by the courts of the power granted to them directly
by the constitution. The actual decision is this: That even where one
party has filed a proper application for change of judge in the statutory
form, the supreme court may order the transfer of a judge to try the
case and such an order will deprive the party of his statutory right to
agree with his opponent on a special judge. 0 The actual decision there-

54.

223 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. 1949).

55. "These sections would seem to be of doubtful validity under the 1945 Constitution, but as that question is not briefed, it will not be determined. It may be
well enough to point out that under Section 29, Article VI of the 1875 Constitution,
Mo. R. S. A. Const. 1875, certain provisions were made respecting substitute judges,
and that the General Assembly was expressly authorized to 'make such additional
provision for holding court as may be found necessary'. The new Constitution contains no such provision. On the contrary, its provisions are: 'Any circuit judge may
sit in any other circuit at the request of a judge thereof.' §15, art. V. 'The Supreme
Court may make temporary transfers of judicial personnel from one court to another
as the administration of justice requires, and may establish rules with respect thereto.
§ 6, art. V." 223 S.W.2d l.c. page 455.
56. The affidavit of prejudice is personal to the challenged judge. State cx rel.
Kansas City Public Service v. Waltner, 169 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1943). Therefore when
the challenged judge is taken out of the case by the transfer of another judge the
affidavit of prejudice becomes Junctus officio.
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fore does not govern the situation in which neither the supreme court
nor the trial court has exercised the Constitutional power of calling in
another judge and the parties have actually agreed upon a special judge
who has tried the case.
The next case did not advance the law beyond the position taken
in the Scott case. It is State v. Emrich.57 It was a criminal prosecution
in which affidavit of prejudice of the original judge was filed. The opinion does not state that the record showed anything either way as to
whether or not the original judge gave the parties a chance to agree on
a special judge or as to whether they requested such procedure. It only
states that the original judge called in another circuit judge and that the
defendant in the supreme court objected to the jurisdiction of such substituted judge. The court held that the substituted judge did have
jurisdiction. The court cited the dictum in the Scott case to the effect
that statutory provisions for special judges were of doubtful constitutionality and it said that if the provision were constitutional they could not
over-ride the self-enforcing provisions of Section 15. It will be noted that
these cases were all criminal cases and hence each one of them involved
a "Simon pure" change of judge and not a change of venue to which a
change of judge was incidental.
Hayes v. Hayesu8 arose in the circuit court of Greene County, a
multi-judge court. It involved an application for change of judge upon
a motion to modify a divorce decree. The sole question presented in the
supreme court was this: Is a proceeding to modify a divorce decree a
"case" within the meaning of the existing statutes regarding "changes
of venue" in civil cases? The supreme court held that it is and that a
change of judge to the other division of the Greene County Circuit
Court should have been awarded. In so holding the court impliedly said
that the change of venue statutes, in so far as they prescribe the grounds
of a change and in so far as they provide for subsequent procedure in
a multi-judge court were constitutional. But the court repeated its
doubts as to the constitutionality of other parts of the statute.59

57. 237 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. 1951).
58. 252 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. 1952).
59. "It appears, therefore, that a circuit judge, who on a motion to modify a
divorce decree, sustains an application for change of venue on the ground of his
prejudice or on the ground of the influence of the opposite party over him may,
irrespective of the provisions of Section 508.110 and 508.140, request another circuit
judge to sit and hear the motion.
"Jurisdictional questions which might arise in the event that a circuit judge,
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We must next note Cantrelt v. City of Caruthersvile.60 In this case
the regular judge, apparently on his own motion, had entered an order
merely stating that he was disqualified and not setting out any of the
statutory reasons for his disqualification. He therefore called in another
circuit judge to try the case. In the supreme court the appellant objected
to this procedure and to the jurisdiction of the substituted judge on the
ground that the court's order must necessarily have been based upon
one of the statutory grounds of disqualification, and that a statement of
such grounds must have been contained in the record. The supreme
court disallowed this contention. It held that the substitution of the new
judge was a transfer of personnel within the meaning of the constitution.
The constitutional grant of power to make such transfer is unconditional.
Therefore, the legislature may not impose a condition upon the exercise
of a power which it did not grant. The power of the circuit court is
concurrent with that of the supreme court but may be exercised only
where the Supreme Court has not acted. This reasoning seems unassailable.
Pogue v. Swink6 carried the development of the law one step
further. The regular judge of the court of origin was the defendant. He
therefore disqualified himself and ordered the case removed to another
county outside of his judicial circuit. The court held that in so doing
he acted erroneously. It ordered the case to be remanded to the court
of origin, stating that another judge would then be transferred to hear
the case in that court. The argument of the court was that the provisions
for judicial transfer contained in Sections 6 and 15, supra, supplanted
the statutory provisions for changes of venue based upon the prejudice
of the judge. In so arguing the court called attention to the fact that the
provisions for the election of a special judge had entered the law just

who sustained an application for change of venue on a motion to modify a divorce
decree, on the grounds provided for disqualification of a judge and who, instead of
exercising his constitutional right to call in another judge to sit in his circuit, transferred or attempted to transfer the proceeding to another county, are not before us.
We express no opinion upon resultant hypothetical situations which might obtain
in such instances.... It appears that a proper and timely application for 'change of
venue' which seeks a 'change of judge' on the statutory grounds provided, should
be sustained when filed in a proceeding to modify a decree of divorce; that in one
county, multiple-judge circuits within the provisions of Section 508.110 the case
should be transferred to another division of the court; that in all other instances

the regular judge should call in another circuit judge to sit in the case, or request
this court to transfer a circuit judge to sit in the case pursuant to Const., 1945, Art.
V,. Section 6, and Supreme Court Rule U1." 252 S.W.2d at p. 329.
60. 255 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1953).
61. 261 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. 1953).
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two years after the adoption of the 1875 constitution, which had contained
a provision to the effect that the legislature might by law provide for
cases in which the judge was unable to hold a term or part of a term.
This argument overlooks the fact that before these provisions were put
in the constitution the legislature had provided for changes of venue to
62
another circuit where the regular judge was interested or prejudiced.
In State ex rel. Ellis v. Creech 63 the holding was that after the disqualification of the regular judge and the transfer of another judge to
try the case the former judge was without jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction.
Adair County v. Urban64 did not add anything new to the law but
presented a peculiar situation. The case had been originally tried before
Judge Brown. Upon a new trial the defendant sought a change of judge
and Judge Higbee was called in. He presided over the trial in the court
of origin which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. After overruling
a motion for new trial, he set aside, sua sponte, the verdict on the ground
that Judge Brown should have transferred the case to another circuit.
The supreme court, following its decisions in the above cited cases, found
that Judge Brown's action had been proper and the granting of a new
trial by Judge Higbee was erroneous. The case does not necessarily involve the rule of Pogue v. Swink but might have been rested on the
authority of the actual decisions in the Hayes, Cantrell, and Scott cases.
But Pogue v. Swink was cited with approval. During the preparation of
this article the supreme court handed down opinions in the cases of
6
In both of these
State ex rel. v. Blair"5 and State ex rel. v. Meriwether.(
cases the rule of the Swink case was followed and applied.
V.
What, then, is the present state of the law? 67 The actual decisions
of the court have clearly established three propositions:
1. Where the original judge is disqualified and no affidavit of pre-

62.
63.

Mo. GEx. STAT. Chap. 158, Page 633 (1865).
259 S.W.2d 372 (Mo. 1953).

64. 268 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1954).
65. 270 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1954).
66. 270 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1954).
67. The discussion in this paper is limited to the procedures for changes of
venues and changes of judge in the circuit and common pleas courts. It may be
pointed out, however, that probate and magistrate courts are also courts of record
of strictly constitutional origin and that their judges therefore come within the
class of judicial personnel mentioned in Section fifteen of Article V. Hence many
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judice has been filed the supreme court may assign another judge or the
original trial judge may request another judge to sit in his place in the
court of origin without first permitting the parties to agree upon a special
judge or upon the election of a special judge.
2. Where an affidavit of prejudice of the judge has been filed the
same procedure may be followed.
3. Where a disqualified trial judge has, sua sponte, noted his own
disqualification or where an affidavit of prejudice has been filed, leveled
at the disqualification of the judge and not containing the charge that
the inhabitants of the county are prejudiced, the case may not be transferred to another circuit.
The actual decisions, as distinguished from dicta, have not yet
answered certain other questions. We shall enumerate some of these,
numbering them for convenience in sequence with the foregoing:
4. Where the original judge is disqualified and a substitute judge has
not been sent in by the supreme court may the original judge, if he so
desire, permit the parties to agree upon a special judge?
5. Where the application for a change merely alleges that the inhabitants of the county are prejudiced, may the trial judge order the
case transferred to a county in an adjoining or next adjoining circuit?
6. Where the application for change alleges prejudice both of the
inhabitants and of the judge, may he transfer the case to an adjoining or
next adjoining circuit?
7. In the light of the Swink, Blair, and Meriwether cases, is the
statutory procedure for substitution of judges in a multi-judge court,
approved in the Hayes case, still to be followed?
Perhaps some aid in answering these questions may be obtained
from a critical analysis of the rationale of the Scott and Swink cases.
The reasoning which seems to underlie the cases under review is this.
Section 6 and 15 of Article V grant to the courts the power to order "the
transfer of judicial personnel". That grant of power is in its nature an
exclusive one and this deprives the legislature of any power to limit

interesting problems will be raised if the reasoning underlying the cited supreme

court opinions is rigorously applied to procedure in these courts. Even in the case
of city police courts their judges or recorders are probably judicial personnel and
existing ordinances and charter provisions providing for changes of judge in those
tribunals may prove unconstitutional.
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or qualify the way in which the courts act in this regard and also deprives
the legislature of the power to prescribe alternative methods by which
such a transfer of judicial personnel may be effected. Statutory provisions, for example, which would require a trial judge to give the parties
the option of selecting a special judge before he called in another circuit
judge or which would require him in all cases to order the transfer of
the case rather than calling in another judge would therefore be a
clearly unconstitutional interference with the power of the courts over
transfers of judicial personnel. But how far does this reasoning tend to
support the third proposition above enumerated which was established
in the Swink, Blair, and Meriwether cases?
Is there, in fact, a transfer of personnel involved in those cases?
The word "transfer" strictly means "to carry across" and thus refers
to a change of position in space. In law, however, it often has a secondary
meaning more or less equivalent to the verb "to substitute". Thus we
speak of a transfer of title when we mean that the complex of jural
relations constituting one man's ownership of a thing are destroyed and
a similar complex of relationships in a new owner simultaneously created.
But the constitutional provisions have to do with a certain particular
kind of transfer. The object of the verb "to transfer" is "judicial personnel". When a substitute judge is called in from another circuit or
from one of the appellate courts to sit in place of the original judge there
is clearly a transfer of judicial personnel. But when a case is removed,
let us say, from the first circuit to the second, the thing which is transferred is the case and not the judge. Of course if the secondary meaning
of the word "transfer" is adopted it might be argued that the power of
the first judge over the case has been destroyed and a similar power in
the second judge has been created. But frankly, this would seem to be
a somewhat strange interpretation of the constitutional language. Furthermore, if this interpretation and the rule of the Swink case were applied
with rigorous logic, a grave, practical difficulty would be met. For if,
under the circumstances of the Meriwether case, in which a disqualified
judge ordered the transfer of an adoption procedding to another circuit.
The removal of a cause from the 10th circuit to the 37th circuit involves a
change in judicial personnel, such a removal would still involve a change
in judicial personnel if the case had been a damage suit instead of an
adoption proceeding and the application for change had been based solely
upon the prejudice of the inhabitants. If this be true there could never
be a change of venue based upon the prejudice of the inhabitants where
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1955
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the court of origin was in a single county circuit, since to get the case out
of the circuit and into another an incidental change of judge would necessarily be involved. No true change of venue could ever be had from St.
Louis City or from St. Louis, Jackson, Buchanan, Greene, or Jasper
Counties. Furthermore, where a circuit contains only two counties the
trial judge may often know that prejudice exists in both of those counties
and he may desire to avail himself of his statutory power to secure freedom from prejudice by ordering the removal of the case to another circuit.
If the rationale of the Meriwether case is carried out with strict logical
consistency he could not do this. These results it is believed would be
most unfortunate. They may be avoided only if the court should hold
that whenever a properly supported claim of prejudice of the inhabitants
is made the cause may be removed from the judicial circuit even though
such removal necessarily involves an incidental change of judge.
Some logical difficulties are involved if we attempt to support the
proposition that the original judge may not even in the absence of a
transfer order by the supreme court voluntarily permit the parties to
agree upon a special judge. Can it be said that such a substitution of
the special judge involves a transfer of judicial personnel? In so far as
the special judge himself is concerned it would require a somewhat
strained interpretation to reach this conclusion. Before his appointment
he is certainly not a member of the class of individuals described as
judicial personnel. Of course it may be said that the regular judge has
been transferred from his connection with the case in the sense that
his power to hear and determine it has been destroyed and a similar
power in the special judge has been created. But in every case where
an affidavit of prejudice is filed against the regular judge his power to
hear and determine the case is thereby terminated and the rule of law
which brings about such termination is contained in the statute and is
not to be found either in the constitution or in the present Supreme
Court Rules. Therefore if the statute is unconstitutional as providing
a rule whose application brings about a change of judge there would
be no legal authority at all for removing the disqualified judge. But all
of the cases have recognized the constitutional validity of that portion
of the statute. The dicta in the decided cases, however, have so strongly
intimated that the statutory provisions for special judges are unconstitutional that it would be highly unsafe for a trial judge to follow the same.
If the rationale of the Swinlc case be carried out logically the reassignment of a case from one division of a multi-judge court to another
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol20/iss1/7
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because of the prejudice of the judge presiding in the first division would
constitute a "transfer of personnel." The provision for such reassignment is purely statutory. Thus the rule of the Swinlc case would seem
to conflict with the decision in the Hayes case and the judge of such a
multi-judge court would have an option of requesting the judge of some
other division to sit in his division for the trial of the case or of calling
in a judge from another circuit.
These many doubts and uncertainties can only be satisfactorily
resolved if and when the supreme court adopts a comprehensive set
of rules governing the subject of change of venue and change of judge
in civil causes. It may not be presumptious to suggest that such rules
like the rules of criminal procedure should clearly distinguish between
the two types of procedure and should clearly recognize the right of
each litigant upon a proper showing of prejudice to obtain either a change
of venue or a change of judge or both. In dealing with the matter of
change of venue it would seem that the court should not feel itself bound
to limit the transfer of the case to another court within the same judicial
circuit. To do so would deprive litigants in the single county circuits
of a right to any change of venue at all and might prevent the selection
of a truly impartial forum in other cases.
Pending the adopting of such rules, it would seem that parties and
trial judges should avoid the use of statutory procedure for agreeing
upon or selecting special judges. Except in the case of single county
circuits it would generally be advisible to limit changes of venue to transfers from one court in the circuit to another court in the same circuit.
In no case should a change out of the circuit be awarded where the
application alleges only the prejudice of the judge. Where both a change
of judge and a change of venue are desired (except in single county circuits) the application should allege the prejudice of both the inhabitants
and the judge. Perhaps the best practice here would be to order the
removal of the case to another county in the same circuit and simultaneously to request the transfer of another circuit judge to sit in the
court to which the cause was removed.
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